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INTRODUCTION
The minimum coverage provision of the Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A,
requires all individuals who are not exempt to maintain a minimum level of health insurance
beginning in 2014, at the same time that guaranteed issue and community rating insurance
industry reforms will also go into effect. The provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to
regulate commerce in the vast interstate health care market and is reasonably adapted to
Congress’s legitimate regulatory goals. Courts that have examined how the health care market
operates, as a practical matter, and how the means of payment for health care services affects the
market as a whole, have properly recognized the rational basis underlying the provision.
Most recently, although unmentioned by plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit – the only Court of
Appeals to rule on this issue – has sustained defendants’ position that the minimum coverage
provision falls within Congress’s commerce power. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, No.
10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *11 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (opinion of Martin, J.); id. at *23
(Sutton, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority rejected the plaintiffs’ “pre-enforcement
facial attack,” recognizing that the “demanding standard” for a facial challenge – that the
challenged law be invalid in all its applications – could not possibly be met here. Id. at *23, 33
(Sutton, J., concurring in judgment); see id. at *11 (opinion of Martin, J.). 
As the majority recognized, the minimum coverage provision constitutes “a regulation on
the activity of participating in the national market for health care delivery, and specifically the
activity of self-insuring” – i.e., forgoing insurance in favor of attempting to pay health care costs
out of pocket. Id. at *10; see id. at *24 (Sutton, J.). “Health care and the means of paying for it
are ‘quintessentially economic,’” Id.; accord id. at *11 (Martin, J.) (“[T]he financing of health
-1-
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care services, and specifically the practice of self-insuring, is economic activity.”). Moreover,
“[n]o one is inactive when deciding how to pay for health care, as self-insurance and private
insurance are two forms of action for addressing the same risk” – the risk, which everyone faces,
of requiring unexpected and expensive medical care. Id. at *29 (Sutton, J.). The majority agreed
that the provision must be upheld on its face because Congress had a rational basis to conclude
that “the practice of self-insuring substantially affects interstate commerce by driving up the cost
of health care as well as by shifting costs to third parties.” Id. at *12 (Martin, J.); id. at *24
(Sutton, J.) (“Faced with $43 billion in uncompensated care, Congress reasonably could require
all covered individuals to pay for health care now so that money would be available later to pay
for all care as the need arises.”). Judge Martin also recognized an independent ground for
upholding the provision – the rational basis for Congress’s conclusion that “leaving those
individuals who self-insure for the cost of health care outside federal control would undercut
[the] overlying economic regulatory scheme” because, “without the minimum coverage
provision, the guaranteed issue and community rating provisions [of the Affordable Care Act]
would increase existing incentives for individuals to delay purchasing health insurance until they
need care.” Id. at *14. 
In their challenge to the minimum coverage provision, plaintiffs offer arguments that,
they recognize, have not been advanced – and have in fact been conceded – by plaintiffs in other
cases challenging the provision. In particular, plaintiffs assert that Congress lacks authority to
regulate the means of payment for services plaintiffs have used and undoubtedly will use again in
the future because the commerce power does not extend to consumption of goods and services
but only to their production. Given that the Supreme Court abandoned this type of formalistic
-2-
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pigeonholing under the Commerce Clause more than 70 years ago, plaintiffs lack legal authority
for their anachronistic approach. As the Court has long understood, such a limitation on
Congress’s authority ignores the realities of a commercial market, where all parties in a
commercial market, from “producers” to “consumers,” are interrelated parts of the same
economic chain of supply and demand. Market participants at any point in the chain can affect
the market’s operation. Here, Congress found that those who participate in the health care market
without insurance receive health care but, on the whole, do not pay the costs of that care. Similar
to the failure to pay child support obligations at issue in United States v. Kukafka, 478 F.3d 531
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 866 (2007), the failure of the uninsured, as a class, to satisfy
their financial obligations in the health care market has a substantial economic effect - in this
case by shifting costs elsewhere, increasing health care costs for all, and insurance costs as well. 
That the uninsured as a class have a substantial impact on the health care market, through
their receipt of health care services for which they do not pay, also belies any notion that they are
passive non-actors. Indeed, all three Sixth Circuit judges in Thomas More, including the
dissenting judge, recognized the fallacy of the activity/inactivity dichotomy. Thomas More, 2011
WL 2556039, at *15 (Martin, J.); id. at *28 (Sutton, J.); id. at *36 (Graham, J., dissenting). As
Judge Sutton concluded, the timing of the provision’s requirement to obtain insurance did not
affect its constitutionality. Id. at *30 (Sutton, J.). A practical understanding of how health
insurance operates as a financial instrument necessarily entails the recognition that insurance is a
means of payment that must be secured in advance, while a particular individual’s risk of
incurring sudden, significant medical expenses remains unrealized. These specific market
realities must be taken into account in a proper Commerce Clause analysis, and compel the
-3-
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conclusion here that the minimum coverage provision satisfies applicable standards. 
The third judge in Thomas More dissented only because he failed to acknowledge those
realities, instead focusing on the health insurance market in isolation, as if it had no connection
to health care services, the underlying good for which health insurance serves as payment. But
that connection is undeniable. After all, health insurance is a means of financing one’s health
care costs, and of managing the unpredictable risks every participant in the health care market
faces. While those with health insurance utilize a financial instrument expressly designed to
address these risks, those without insurance are “addressing the same risk” through self-
insurance. Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *29 (Sutton, J.). 
But because uninsured individuals may be unable to pay for the health care services they
need and receive – given the high costs of medical services, as well as existing laws that require
that some care be given without regard to ability to pay  – self-insurance does not cover the entire
risk. Rather, a significant percentage of the costs that the self-insured, as a class, incur are shifted
to others in the health care market. Indeed, plaintiffs themselves face a clear risk of incurring
medical expenses beyond their means, given their net income of less than $39,000 last year and
the uncertainty of their future health care needs. This risk is present even if until now, as
plaintiffs allege, they have been able to pay their medical bills without insurance. In any event, as
the Court recognized in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), Congress is entitled to rely on the aggregate impact of a class of conduct, without
regard to whether any specific individual will contribute to that impact or not. The record before
the Court establishes a rational basis for Congress’s conclusions. Moreover, even if there were a
possibility that the provision might be invalid in a specific instance (though there is no genuine
-4-
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suggestion that this might be so), plaintiffs have certainly failed to show that the provision is
invalid in all of its applications. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ facial challenge must fail.
In sum, Congress enacted the minimum coverage provision in conjunction with other
reforms designed to lower health care costs and eliminate barriers to using insurance as the
means of payment for health care services. Congress intended these reforms to stem a crisis in
the interstate health care market in which health insurance had become increasingly difficult to
maintain, yet paying for health care without insurance had become, on the whole, impossible,
with the uninsured shifting ever greater costs onto other market participants. As one element
within a broader regulatory scheme, in an interstate market that comprises 17% of the national
economy, the minimum coverage provision does not come close to crossing the line between
what is local and what is national. The provision fits well within Congress’s commerce power.
At the very least, plaintiffs “have not shown that the [provision] exceeds that power in all of its
applications.” Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *33 (Sutton, J., concurring in judgment).
Finally, the provision is valid under Congress’s taxing power as well. While plaintiffs
rely on a supposed linguistic distinction between a “tax” and a “penalty,” they do not deny that
the minimum coverage provision will raise revenue. Moreover, the payments made pursuant to
the minimum coverage provision, which is located within the Tax Code at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A,
are calculated in part based on a taxpayer’s household income and collected together with annual
income taxes. These payments look and operate like taxes, and Congress was not required to call
the provision a tax in order to exercise its taxing power. Indeed, given the strong presumption
that legislation enacted by Congress is constitutional, the task of this Court is to determine
whether it can identify constitutional authority for the statute, not whether Congress identified
-5-
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that authority. For all these reasons, plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment should be
denied, and the Court should dismiss plaintiffs’ claims or, in the alternative, enter summary
judgment in favor of defendants.
ARGUMENT
I. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
CONGRESS’S POWERS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
A. The Minimum Coverage Provision Satisfies Established Commerce Clause
Requirements
1. Congress Had a Rational Basis to Conclude that Attempting to Pay
for Health Care Without Insurance Substantially Affects Interstate
Commerce
Defendants established in their opening summary judgment brief that Congress had more
than a rational basis to conclude that attempting to pay for health care services out of pocket has
a substantial effect, in the aggregate, on interstate commerce. Def. Br. (dkt. #44) at 10-13. As
defendants explained, because people cannot predict with accuracy the timing or extent of their
health care needs, and because health care expenses can rapidly surpass the average person’s
budget, individuals who go without health insurance are likely to incur health care costs that they
will not pay. The aggregate effect of that failure to pay for care received runs in the tens of
billions of dollars annually – rising to $43 billion in 2008 alone – and these costs are shifted to
other participants in the interstate health care market. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). Applying the
principles set forth in Raich and Wickard, Congress’s rational recognition of this substantial
effect was a sufficient basis for Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision pursuant to
its commerce power. See, e.g., Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *12; Mead v. Holder, 766 F.
-6-
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Supp. 2d 16, 34 n.10 (D.D.C. 2011), appeal pending, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir.); Liberty Univ. Inc.
v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 634 (W.D. Va. 2010), appeal pending, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir.).
In challenging that conclusion, plaintiffs advance an argument that they themselves
acknowledge has not been made in any other challenge to the minimum coverage provision. Pl.
Br. (dkt. #47-1) at 9. Specifically, they focus on the notion that Congress can regulate commerce
only “on the supply side of the economic supply and demand equation.” Id. In plaintiffs’ view,
“consumers,” such as those who utilize health care services without insurance, are by definition
beyond Congress’s regulatory reach.
But other plaintiffs in these Affordable Care Act challenges have eschewed such an
argument – and for good reason. Namely, the Supreme Court has already expressly rejected the
dichotomy between “producers,” on the one hand, and “consumers,” on the other. The Court in
Wickard held that “[w]hether the subject of the regulation in question was ‘production,’
‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is . . . not material for purposes of deciding” whether the
regulation fell within Congress’s commerce power. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.  Indeed, the law at1
issue in Wickard regulated the plaintiff there as a consumer of his own wheat as well as its
producer – it was the potential that wheat consumers who relied on their own supplies might not
Indeed, in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, courts have commonly recognized1
that Congress’s commerce power includes the power to protect consumers, as well as producers.
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 578 (1997) (dormant
Commerce Clause was “designed to prevent” state regulations that “give local consumers an
advantage over consumers in other States” (internal quotation omitted)); accord
Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Penn. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 261 (3d Cir.
2006). This recognition reflects the economic reality that consumption and production are
inextricably linked. By its plain terms, the Commerce Clause does not distinguish between the
two. The limiting principle in Commerce Clause analysis is thus not whether the object of
regulation is “consumption,” rather than “production,” but whether it is sufficiently related to
interstate commerce.
-7-
Case 1:10-cv-00763-CCC   Document 53    Filed 07/18/11   Page 13 of 37
purchase wheat in the interstate market that, in the aggregate, had a substantial effect on
commerce – and the Court made no distinction between the two. See id. at 127. In Raich, the
Court similarly upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act to both plaintiffs, where
one of them cultivated her own marijuana but the other was merely a consumer of the drug, who
obtained her supply from others. Raich, 545 U.S. at 7 (recognizing that the law at issue
prohibited  “possessing” or “obtaining” marijuana as well as manufacturing it); id. at 40 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“That simple possession is a noneconomic activity is immaterial to whether it can
be prohibited as a necessary part of a larger regulation.”).
The radical nature of plaintiffs’ “consumer” theory is further demonstrated by their claim
that consumers “do not submit themselves to congressional regulation” by virtue of a purchase.
Pl. Br. at 19. Thus, under their position, even those who have purchased health insurance already
could not be regulated under Congress’s commerce power. However, this notion is flatly
contradicted by the existence of flood insurance requirements for those who purchase property in
a flood hazard area, 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(e), and by the potential that any property owner may be
required, as a by-product of Congress’s authority to regulate the channels of interstate commerce,
to give up the property they have purchased in return for just compensation when their land is
needed for the construction of railroad tracks, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992). The federal prohibition on possession of controlled
substances also comes into effect when an individual purchases an illegal drug. Plaintiffs’
attempt to distinguish Raich on the basis that Congress can prohibit possession but cannot
regulate “legal purchase, possession and consumption,” Pl. Br. at 19, makes no sense because the
activity regulated in both instances is the same. Imposing criminal sanctions on an individual for
-8-
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illegal possession of a controlled substance – which may include imprisonment – is just as much
(if not more) a regulation of “the person of the consumer,” id., as a requirement to maintain
minimum essential health insurance coverage. Indeed, the Court in Raich relied on Wickard,
which did not “prohibit” the possession of wheat but regulated the consumption of home-grown
wheat versus wheat bought in the commercial market. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-18 (describing
the effect of the regulation at issue in Wickard as preventing a wheat farmer from “consuming
[excess wheat] on his own farm”).
Given this authority, other plaintiffs in Affordable Care Act challenges have readily – and
necessarily – conceded that Congress can constitutionally require individuals who are currently
uninsured to purchase insurance at the “point of sale” – i.e., at the time when they actually face
an immediate need for health care services. E.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., No. 10-91, 2011 WL 285683, at *26 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (“Congress plainly
has the power to regulate [consumers of health care services] . . . at the time that they initially
seek medical care[], a fact with which the plaintiffs agree.”). Judge Sutton in Thomas More also
recognized as uncontroversial the principle that Congress can constitutionally “impose a federal
condition (ability to pay) on the consumption of a service bound up in federal commerce
(medical care)” by requiring individuals at the point that they seek medical care to “either pay for
the care or buy medical insurance from then on.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *30
(Sutton, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Plaintiffs’ supposedly novel objection to the minimum coverage provision, therefore,
turns out to be a non-starter. Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by
artificial labels. Rather,“‘broad principles of economic practicality’” inform Congress’s authority
-9-
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in this area. Id. at *24 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 571 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)); see also Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). Congress can take a
“pragmatic, factual approach” to regulating interstate commerce, Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962), without regard to “‘any formula which would give controlling
force to nomenclature.’” Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *24 (Sutton, J.) (quoting Wickard,
317 U.S. at 120). That includes the regulation of “consumers” when their conduct, in the
aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Aside from their ineffective “consumer”-based objection, plaintiffs rely on the standard
“inactivity” fallacy that other plaintiffs in these challenges have invoked. But that, too, is a non-
starter when one reflects on a single, obvious fact: If individuals who chose not to have health
insurance were truly passive in the relevant market, they could not be engaging in conduct that,
in the aggregate, shifts billions of dollars annually to other market participants. Yet that is exactly
what Congress found was occurring, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F), and there is more than a
rational basis for that conclusion. 
This is not a situation where individuals are simply choosing not to spend money on a
particular product, and Congress is insisting that, instead, they must buy that product, either “for
their own good” or in order to “do their part” for the economy as a whole. Rather, the situation
here is that uninsured people are not paying for health care services that they receive. And not
only are they failing to pay, but their means of payment – out of pocket rather than through
insurance – makes it substantially likely at the outset that they will not be able to afford any
significant health care expenses that arise, and that other market participants will bear those
costs. In other words, understanding the economic realities of the interstate health care market
-10-
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requires an understanding of the financial risks involved in that market. In particular, Judge
Sutton points out that “inaction is action . . . when it comes to financial risk.” Id. at *28.
Everyone in the health care market faces the financial risk of incurring completely unexpected,
extremely high medical expenses, and health insurance is simply a means of managing that risk.
As Judge Sutton explains, “[n]o one is inactive when deciding how to pay for health care, as self-
insurance and private insurance are two forms of action for addressing the same risk.” Id. at *29.  2
The majority in Thomas More recognized that Congress acted within its Commerce
Clause authority in light of these economic realities. Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *12
(“Congress had a rational basis to believe that the practice of self-insuring for the cost of health
care, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.”) (Martin, J.); id. at *24
(“Congress could reasonably conclude that the decisions and actions of the self-insured
substantially affect interstate commerce.”) (Sutton, J.). As the majority understood, the class of
individuals who address the “risk of not having the assets to pay for health care” when one needs
Even the dissent in Thomas More made short shift of the supposed activity/inactivity2
distinction that the plaintiffs in these cases have proposed. Id. at *36 (Graham, J., dissenting) (“I
do not interpret [Commerce Clause jurisprudence] as drawing a constitutional line between
activity and inactivity.”). Where the dissent in Thomas More erred was in holding that those
without insurance were not “participants” in the relevant market, which the dissent identified as
the market in health insurance. Id. at *37. But to view the health insurance market as a stand-
alone market for a consumer good is to ignore Congress’s intent as well as economic reality.
Congress’s goal in enacting the Affordable Care Act was to increase the availability of health
care; its insurance regulations are merely a means of achieving that goal. In addition, the
economic relationship between health insurance and the health care market is clear simply from
the description of the substantial effects that Congress identified. Those effects are a direct result
of participation in the health care market by those who do not have health insurance. If the
uninsured were truly outside the relevant market, they could not incur debt or shift costs as a
result of their participation in that market. The minimum coverage provision regulates payment
for health care services, and health insurance is the means of payment that the provision requires,
based on Congress’s finding that the other means of payment – attempting to pay out of pocket,
or “self-insurance” – is ineffective and shifts burdensome costs to others.
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it, through self-insurance, rather than insurance, incur costs beyond their means and shifts those
costs to others. Id.; FAMILIES USA FOUND., HIDDEN HEALTH TAX: AMERICANS PAY A PREMIUM
2 (2009) (“FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN HEALTH TAX”) 2. Congress therefore determined that self-
insurance is ineffective as a means of addressing the risks that we all face in the interstate health
care market, leading people to incur financial obligations that, in the aggregate, they fail to meet.
In this Circuit, there is already clear precedent for upholding Congress’s power to
regulate in this context. In Kukafka, the Third Circuit demonstrated its understanding that a
failure to pay money that one owes (in that case, to satisfy child support obligations) can have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce and can therefore properly fall within the scope of
Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce. Kukafka, 478 F.3d at 536. The court observed that
the “failure to fulfill a financial obligation ‘gives rise to a debt which implicates economic
activity.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Parker, 108 F.3d 28, 31 (3d Cir. 1997)). Indeed, the
legislative history underlying the Deadbeat Parents Act indicated that the unpaid obligations to
which the Act would apply in a single year “total billions of dollars.” Parker, 108 F.3d at 31.
Similar to the failure to pay child support obligations, as described by the Third Circuit,
the failure to pay for health care services imposes a billions-of-dollars cost, annually, on the
interstate market. This debt, too, implicates economic activity, and the shifted costs that result
from this failure to pay reverberate throughout the interstate health care market, ultimately
increasing health care costs for all, and insurance premiums for those who do have insurance. 42
U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F); H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. II, at 985 (2010); FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN
HEALTH TAX, at 2; COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS (“CEA”), ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 187 (2010). Congress could rationally conclude that these impacts are substantial. Its
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enactment of the minimum coverage provision to address those effects therefore falls squarely
within its commerce power.  3
Moreover, Congress’s decision to impose the minimum essential coverage requirement
before individuals face an urgent need for expensive medical care is inconsequential. “It cannot
be maintained that the exertion of federal power must await the disruption of . ..  commerce.” 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1938).  To the contrary, Congress may
adopt “reasonable preventive measures” to avoid disruptions to interstate commerce before they
occur. Id. Congress did not need to wait until each uninsured individual shifts costs to others, or
is on the verge of doing so. 
Indeed, in this context, the timing of the provision is simply a reflection of how insurance
– and self-insurance – function as means of payment within the health care market. Because
health insurance is a means of managing financial risk, it must be acquired at a point where the
risk remains uncertain. Health insurance could not operate as an effective instrument of payment
“if people could simply buy their insurance on the way to the hospital.” 47 Million and Counting:
Why the Health Care Marketplace Is Broken: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong.
14 (2008) (statement of Prof. Hall). If an individual self-insures, the odds are that that individual
will be unable to pay for significant medical expenses that arise. Yet even when health care
providers can predict, based on method of payment alone, that the prospects of receiving
payment from a patient are slim, our society is not prepared to turn individuals away when they
present a need for emergency care but lack insurance. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
(“CBO”), KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE PROPOSALS 13 (2008)
See Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) ¶¶ 12-15, 19-24, and materials cited therein.3
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(“KEY ISSUES”). Indeed, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (“EMTALA”)
requires all hospitals that participate in Medicare and require emergency services to stabilize any
patient who arrives with an emergency condition, without regard to ability to pay. 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd; see also 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 449.8(a). As explained in defendants’ opening brief,
this reality is one factor underlying Congress’s finding that the failure to maintain health
insurance has an aggregate substantial impact on interstate commerce. Def. Br. at 19-20; SMF ¶¶
13-15. Thus, while requiring insurance at the “point of sale” is constitutionally permissible, it is
economically and ethically unworkable. A conclusion that the Constitution permits the
inconceivable prospect of conditioning emergency care on insurance, but prohibits placing the
insurance requirement at the point where, economically and reasonably, it belongs – where the
sole distinction is one of timing – makes no sense. Rather,  “[r]equiring insurance today and
requiring it at a future point of sale amount to policy differences in degree, not kind.” Thomas
More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *30 (Sutton, J.).
Plaintiffs also characterize the minimum coverage provision as an improper exercise of a
federal police power because the provision imposes an affirmative obligation. See Pl. Br. at 21.
However, contrary to plaintiffs’ strained reading, the concern in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
to distinguish “between what is national and what is local,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, does not turn
on whether the regulation at issue imposes an affirmative obligation rather than a prohibition.
Indeed, the laws that the Court struck down in Lopez and in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000), were themselves prohibitory, designed to deter or punish the possession of a gun in a
school zone, in Lopez, and violent crimes against women, in Morrison. The distinction between
positive and negative obligations, in the regulatory context, is often merely a matter of phrasing
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and does not control whether the object of regulation is “interstate” in character. Simply put,
“[t]he power to regulate includes the power to prescribe and proscribe.” Thomas More, 2011 WL
2556039, at *28 (Sutton, J.). Indeed, as the specificity of any prohibition increases, the
distinction from a mandate blurs. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
261-262 (1964) (upholding prohibition on racial discrimination by motels – in effect, compelling
them to accept guests regardless of race). The mere fact that the minimum coverage provision
affirmatively requires individuals to maintain health insurance in order to pay their health care
costs – rather than, for example, prohibiting them from failing to pay the costs they incur – does
not transform this regulation into an attempt to exercise a federal police power. 
Nor is it correct to view the fact that not everyone will fail to pay their health care costs in
any given year, if left free to forgo health insurance, as a question of piling inference upon
inference as the Supreme Court described that problem in Lopez. Again, the issue is purely one
of understanding market realities, and the timing of the obligation imposed by the minimum
coverage provision cannot change the constitutional analysis. In Raich, there was no certainty
that the marijuana grown for use by the two plaintiffs in that case would be diverted to the illegal
drug market. Yet the Court did not view that lack of certainty as detracting from Congress’s
power to regulate activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce. The
link between the regulated activity – possession of marijuana for medical use – and interstate
commerce did not depend on an attenuated series of inferences because that activity itself created
a “likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw” homegrown marijuana into
the market for illegal drugs. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added); see id. at 40 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that, given market realities, homegrown marijuana was always “an
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instant from the interstate market”). Whether any given individual’s medical marijuana was
diverted was immaterial; accordingly, whether the series of steps that would be required for
homegrown marijuana to reach the drug market actually occurred in any given instance was
likewise irrelevant. The relevant point was that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that, in
the aggregate, homegrown marijuana originally intended for medical use would be drawn into the
market. The aggregate impact – given the odds that some individuals’ ostensibly medical
marijuana would be diverted – was rationally deemed substantial. Raich, 545 U.S. at 31-32.
Similarly in Wickard, it was entirely possible that a given individual seeking to consume
homegrown wheat would, if deprived of that source of wheat, not turn to the market to fill that
need, but would simply eat something else. Yet the Court recognized that market realities made it
inevitable that homegrown wheat would in general affect supply and demand in the interstate
wheat market, and that one individual’s “contribution [to the impact on interstate commerce],
taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 127-28.
Significantly in both Raich and Wickard, the Court analyzed the “aggregate impact” of
the class of activities at issue at a point before the plaintiffs in those cases had (as far as we
know) done anything themselves to contribute to that impact. The Court’s analysis was based on
how the markets at issue operated. The situation here is no different. The record before the Court
provides ample basis to understand that, given how the health care market operates, the aggregate
impact of attempting to pay for health care out of pocket, rather than through insurance, is
substantial, and that there is a rational basis for Congress’s conclusions. Unlike the laws at issue
in Lopez or Morrison, the minimum coverage provision addresses conduct that, by itself, is a
-16-
Case 1:10-cv-00763-CCC   Document 53    Filed 07/18/11   Page 22 of 37
means of responding to already-present financial risks. Individuals who do not have health
insurance are instead managing the risks of future health care costs by self-insuring. Id. at *29
(Sutton, J.) (“self-insurance and private insurance are two forms of action for addressing the
same risk”). However, as explained above, Congress found that this means of managing financial
risk, by itself, creates a likelihood that self-insured individuals will be unable to pay for medical
expenses they incur and will, as a result, shift those costs to others. The link is “not at all
attenuated” because, by “attempting to fulfill their own demand for a commodity rather than
resort to the market,” the self-insured “are thereby thwarting Congress’s efforts to stabilize
prices.” Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *12 (Martin, J.). 
There is undeniably a rational basis for Congress’s conclusion that self-insurance, as a
form of risk management and payment for health care services, leads directly to cost-shifting, 
given that even modest health care needs can quickly lead to bills in the thousands of dollars. See
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF HEALTH PLANS, 2010 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: MEDICAL
AND HOSPITAL FEES BY COUNTRY; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE RESEARCH
BRIEF, THE VALUE OF HEALTH INSURANCE: FEW OF THE UNINSURED HAVE ADEQUATE
RESOURCES TO PAY POTENTIAL HOSPITAL BILLS 8 (2011). Certainly a family of four, such as
plaintiffs’, with an income of less than $39,000 in 2010,  may incur costs beyond their ability to4
pay from an unexpected serious injury or illness, regardless of whether they have been able to
pay their expenses in the past, and plaintiffs do not deny that this is so.  In the aggregate, this5
See Decl. of Pl. Barbara Goudy-Bachman (dkt. #47-2) ¶ 9.4
Plaintiffs state in passing that “the vast majority of those who are not otherwise covered5
by a federal program, pay for the services they receive – including those who have ordered their
lives in such a manner as to pay for medical services as they come due.” Pl. Br. at 23. However,
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class of conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, as evidenced by the finding that
$43 billion in uncompensated costs were imposed on the market in 2008 alone. The minimum
coverage provision can be upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power on this
basis.
2. Congress Had a Rational Basis to Conclude that the Minimum
Coverage Provision Is Essential to its Guaranteed Issue and
Community Rating Reforms of the Health Insurance Market
Further, and independently, defendants have also established that the minimum coverage
provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power because it is an essential component
within the broader regulatory scheme of guaranteed issue and community rating insurance
reforms that Congress enacted in the Affordable Care Act. Def. Br. at 13-17. Congress may
properly regulate when it has a rational basis to conclude that “failure to regulate [a] class of
activity would undercut [a broader] regulation of the interstate market.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22;
see also id. at 37-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Again, based on its understanding of
how the health care and health insurance markets function, Congress determined that certain
aspects of the current system have resulted in untenable barriers to individuals’ ability to obtain
plaintiffs offer no evidentiary support for this claim. Given studies that document the opposite –
showing that those without insurance continue to use health care, FAMILIES USA, HIDDEN
HEALTH TAX, at 2 (uninsured used $116 billion worth of health care in 2008), but often cannot
afford to pay for the health care they receive, see, e.g., HHS, ASPE RESEARCH BR., at 1; that
62% of personal bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses, 42 U.S.C. §
18091(a)(2)(G); and that the premiums of insured families are over $1000 higher each year due
to cost-shifting, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F) – plaintiffs’ unsupported assertion in no way
undermines the rational basis for Congress’s contrary conclusion. Indeed, the documented costs
of specific medical procedures –  averaging $60,000 for bypass surgery, $13,000 for an
appendectomy, $29,000 for an angioplasty, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF HEALTH PLANS,
2010 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT 13, 15, 16 – by themselves call into question plaintiffs’
assertion, particularly for families that, like plaintiffs’ have a net income of less than $39,000 in
one year.
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health insurance (and correspondingly, their ability to obtain health care services). Specifically,
many people could not obtain or maintain health insurance because insurers could deny insurance
altogether or charge higher, often unaffordable premiums due to pre-existing conditions or
medical history. That, in turn, has meant that many individuals most in need of health care
services have been unable to obtain them.
In the Affordable Care Act, Congress therefore establishes guaranteed issue and
community rating requirements, which prohibit insurers from denying coverage or charging
higher rates based on individuals’ medical conditions or histories. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1,
300gg-3, 300gg-4(a). These reforms, set to go into effect for all individuals in 2014, are designed
to increase the availability and affordability of health insurance, and, as a result, to enable more
individuals to obtain needed health care services. Yet, Congress recognized that these reforms
could also encourage individuals to forgo insurance until they required care, which would
fundamentally alter the nature of health insurance as a means of managing risk and impair the
insurance market’s ability to function. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(H), (I). Congress’s enactment of
the minimum coverage provision was designed to counteract the incentives to forgo insurance
that these reforms might create. The status of the minimum coverage provision as an essential
element within a broad regulatory scheme is another basis for upholding Congress’s authority to
enact the provision under the Commerce Clause. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly disregard this aspect of Congress’s commerce power. Their citation
of the Court’s observation in Lopez that the law in issue in that case was not “an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity,” Pl. Br. at 28 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561), only
reinforces the distinction between Lopez and the case at hand. By making that distinction in
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Lopez, the Court clearly signaled that Congress may regulate an interstate activity in a context
where there is a rational basis to conclude that doing so is essential to a comprehensive
regulatory scheme.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25; see also id. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the6
judgment) (“Though the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the Court nevertheless recognized
that it could be regulated as ‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”).
This is just such a context. Upholding the minimum coverage provision on this basis does not
qualify as “bootstrap[ping].” Pl. Br. at 17. Rather, the analysis is a well established part of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Rather than acknowledging this fact and squarely addressing defendants’ analysis (and
that of other courts that have upheld the provision), plaintiffs instead make broad
pronouncements of the importance of individual liberty and dire predictions of how “radical
environmental constituencies” could require all Americans to install solar panels in their homes.
Id. at 22-23. It should be noted, first of all, that plaintiffs’ opinion of Congress’s “pedestrian
policy goal of providing health insurance to the uninsured . . . or health care coverage to those
with pre-existing medical conditions,” id. at 20, is not a proper basis for a constitutional
challenge. Whether plaintiffs approve of Congress’s regulatory goals is an issue for a political,
not a judicial, forum. Moreover, although the limitations on federal action under the Commerce
Clause are one protection of individual liberty, that does not mean that an allegation relating to
The intrastate activity itself need not be economic, though as explained above, the choice6
of an ineffective means of financial risk management (i.e., attempted but often unsuccessful self-
insurance that ends up shifting the substantial costs of uncompensated health care services to
others in the health care market) is inherently economic.
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individual liberty is properly framed as a Commerce Clause challenge, where the judicial
standard has focused on substantial effects on interstate commerce and a provision’s importance
to a regulatory scheme. A challenge to the minimum coverage provision that is grounded in the
notion that individual rights have been violated would properly arise under the Fifth Amendment
rather than through a Commerce Clause challenge. Yet, for all their repeated invocations of
“individual liberty,” plaintiffs have raised no substantive due process challenge to the minimum
coverage provision. Had they raised such a claim, it is well established that purely economic
regulations of the kind at issue here need survive only rational basis scrutiny in order to satisfy
due process requirements. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)
(recognizing Congress’s presumptive authority to enact legislation “adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life”). The minimum coverage provision easily satisfies such scrutiny. 
The Court also need not be detained by plaintiffs’ fears of being forced to install solar
panels. The distinguishing features of the minimum coverage provision, and the operation of the
health care and health insurance markets, have already been detailed. Whatever limits that
Congress faces in exercising its commerce power are not threatened by the minimum coverage
provision, which regulates the means of payment for services that virtually everyone, including
plaintiffs, receive. As in any Commerce Clause case, Congress’s regulation can be tested against
those limits only within the context of the particular markets at issue. Time after time, whether in
Lopez, Morrison, Wickard, or Raich, the Supreme Court has engaged in this practical, context-
based analysis – and in Lopez and Morrison, did recognize that the bounds of Congress’s
commerce power were exceeded – without relying on the formulaic distinctions, between
“consumer” and “producer,” “activity” and “inactivity,” that plaintiffs propose. Unlike the stand-
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alone laws struck down in Lopez and Morrison, Congress included the minimum coverage
provision as one component within a broader regulatory scheme. Moreover, the regulated
conduct – financing the costs of health care – is “decidedly economic.” Thomas More, 2011 WL
2556039, at *11. To the extent plaintiffs wish to raise the specter of Congress compelling passive
individuals to make an unwanted purchase of a product that has no relationship to their current
participation in any market, the minimum coverage provision does not meet that description.
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Necessary and Proper Means of
Regulating Interstate Commerce
Defendants have explained that the minimum coverage provision is not only essential to
achieving the guaranteed issue and community rating reforms that Congress implemented in the
Affordable Care Act, but also a means reasonably adapted to that legitimate end. Congress
plainly has the authority to regulate the health care market. United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d
259, 269 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the health care market is plainly interstate and that
“[t]he relationships among patients, providers, and insurers are extraordinarily complex”). It may
also regulate  payment for health care, including the use of health insurance for that purpose.
United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).  The Affordable Care Act’s7
guaranteed issue and community rating reforms are therefore undeniably a “legitimate end”
Plaintiffs make the extraordinary claim that “the history of federal involvement in7
regulating the health care insurance market is nonexistent.” Pl. Br. at 27-28. This claim is plainly
false. Such laws as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (“ERISA”) (1974); the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (“COBRA”); the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (“HIPAA”) (1996); and the Paul Wellstone and Pete
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 512,
122 Stat. 3765, 3881 (“MHPAEA”), not to mention the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
plainly document Congress’s extensive involvement in this area.
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within the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78,
87 (3d Cir. 2011). The minimum coverage provision is plainly adapted to effectuate that end,
again taking into account the unique features of the health care market. 
Plaintiffs dispute the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause, first of all, because,
they contend, Congress may not regulate noneconomic activity. Pl. Br. at 26. However, to the
extent there is a requirement that regulated conduct qualify as economic, but see Raich, 545 U.S.
at 18, it is plainly met here. Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *11 (opinion of Martin, J.). As
the Third Circuit recognized in Kukafka, the failure to pay an amount owed is quintessentially
economic. See Kukafka, 478 F.3d at 536.
Plaintiffs also argue that the “five considerations” listed by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010), weigh against the provision’s validity under
the Necessary and Proper Clause. However, the Court in Comstock did not list these
considerations as a “test” that must in every instance be satisfied. See id. To the contrary, far
from purporting to overrule nearly 200 years of jurisprudence, Comstock affirmed the Court’s
long-standing application of “means-end” rationality review in the Necessary and Proper Clause
context. Id. at 1956-57. The Third Circuit’s recent opinion in Pendleton confirms that, under
Comstock, the “relevant inquiry” is the same as it has been since McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316 (1819) – namely, “whether the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment
of a legitimate end under the commerce power or under other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to implement.” Pendleton, 636 F.3d at 87 (internal quotation omitted). As
already explained, the minimum coverage provision passes this rational basis review. 
The final argument that plaintiffs mount against Congress’s authority under the
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Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause is their assertion that, in fact, the minimum
coverage provision will not be effective in preventing individuals from forgoing health insurance
until they require medical care. Pl. Br. at 29-31. Plaintiffs assert that individuals will still face
economic incentives to “just pay a small fine and wait to secure health care insurance after they
become ill – and then drop such coverage when they are healed.” Id. at 31. However, the
Congressional Budget Office has projected that, by 2019, the Act will reduce the number of
uninsured by about 32 or 33 million, including 24 million who would purchase insurance through
the new Exchanges. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to House Speaker John
Boehner, table 3 (Feb. 18, 2011) (attached hereto as Exhibit A); Letter from Douglas W.
Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to the Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
(“CBO Letter to Speaker Pelosi”) 9 (Mar. 20, 2010). Congress is entitled to rely on these
findings. Plaintiffs’ objection to the provision amounts to a policy dispute, not a claim for the
Court to address.  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 261-62 (whether Congress “could
have pursued other methods to eliminate the obstructions found in interstate commerce . . . . is a
matter of policy that rests entirely with the Congress not with the courts”)
 Again, the question under the Necessary and Proper Clause is whether the provision is
“rationally related” to the end that Congress sought to achieve. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.
Plaintiffs’ mere disagreement with the provision, or with expert views on its effectiveness, do not
undermine the rational relationship here. The relationship of the minimum coverage provision to
Congress’s legitimate goal of implementing guaranteed issue and community rating reforms is
not merely rational. It is compelling. As previously explained, the varying experiences of states
that have adopted similar insurance reforms, and the correlation between the success of those
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state reforms with the inclusion of a minimum coverage provision, are by themselves sufficient
justification to find a rational basis for Congress’s conclusion that the minimum coverage
provision would not only help, but is “essential” to make those reforms effective. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 18091(a)(2)(I); Def. Br. at 15-17 (describing reform efforts in New Jersey, New York, and
Massachusetts).
Even without regard to the deferential standard under which Congress’s enactments must
be reviewed, plaintiffs’ reasoning is inherently flawed. For one thing, plaintiffs themselves assert
that they intend to comply with the minimum coverage provision because they are law-abiding
citizens. In addition, while Congress reasonably recognized that, without the minimum coverage
provision, some will be encouraged to forgo insurance until they fall ill or have an accident, the
decision to forgo insurance, even with Congress’s guaranteed issue and community rating
insurance reforms, is not necessarily economically sound. For those who would continue to forgo
insurance even after the provision takes effect, there remains a significant chance that a sudden
accident or illness could result in significant expenses before an individual has a chance to buy
insurance. In sum, nothing in  plaintiffs’ arguments overcomes the deference to which
Congress’s legislative judgments are entitled, nor do plaintiffs meet the standard for mounting a
pre-enforcement facial challenge by showing that “no set of circumstances exists” under which
the minimum coverage provision would be a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168,
172 (3d Cir. 2011). “If Congress has the power to regulate the national healthcare market, as all
seem to agree, it is difficult to see why it lacks authority to regulate a unique feature of that
market by requiring all to pay now in affordable premiums for what virtually none can pay later
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in the form of, say, $100,000 (or more) of medical bills prompted by a medical emergency.”
Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *30 (Sutton, J., concurring in judgment). There is not even
a reasonable question that this is true for those who have already purchased insurance, nor, one
might think, for those like plaintiffs who, in their current uninsured status, with an annual income
of $39,000 and reaching the time of life when, they concede, health care needs typically increase,
present a plain risk of incurring significant costs they cannot afford to pay. Plaintiffs’ facial
challenge must be rejected, and summary judgment entered in defendants’ favor.
II. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS ALSO A VALID EXERCISE OF
CONGRESS’S POWER UNDER THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
As discussed in defendants’ opening brief, the minimum coverage provision is also
authorized as an exercise of Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause. Def. Br. at 29-
33. Plaintiffs claim that their counsel’s “survey of the published and available tax codes of the
English speaking nations” failed to locate a law similar to the minimum coverage provision that
was “incorporated into that nation’s tax code.” Pl. Br. at 31. However, the minimum coverage
provision is a part of the United States’ tax code. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A. Plaintiffs’ attempt to
discount Congress’s authority to enact the provision pursuant to its taxing power boils down to
the claim that the provision “is simply not a tax.” Pl. Br. at 32. Their reliance on the notion that
the § 5000A penalty is not “label[ed]” a tax misses the mark. A tax is determined by how it
operates, and regardless of whether Congress expressly invokes its taxing power, “for Congress
is not required to discuss or explain explicitly the constitutional basis for laws that it enacts.”
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir.
1997). Applying the presumption of constitutionality, a court’s task is “to determine whether
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Congress had the authority to adopt the legislation, not whether it correctly guessed the source of
that power.”  Usery v. Charleston Co. Sch. Dist., 558 F. 2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977).
If Congress had the affirmative intention that the minimum coverage payment not be
considered a “tax,” it would be odd to require taxpayers to make the payment with their annual
tax returns; to calculate it, in part, as a percentage of income; to make those filing joint returns
jointly liable for the payment; to charge the Secretary of the Treasury with administering it; and
to exempt individuals who do not file tax returns. In light of these glaring attributes of taxation,
one would expect some indication clearer than the use of the word “penalty,” applicable to other
tried and true taxes, of Congress’s contrary intent. Yet, there is not a whisper in the legislative
history that Congress wished to eschew invocation of its taxing power. To the contrary,
congressional leaders specifically defended the provision as an exercise of the taxing power. For
example, the Senate explicitly invoked the taxing power when the provision was challenged in
constitutional points of order. 155 Cong. Rec. S13,830, S13,832 (Dec. 23, 2009). Members of
Congress also invoked the taxing power at other points during legislative debates on the
provision. E.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); id. at H1824,
H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753 (Dec. 22, 2009)
(Sen. Leahy); id. at S13,558, S13,581-82 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus).
Plaintiffs also call the § 5000A penalty a “punishment,” and the Thomas More court as
well described the minimum coverage provision as “regulat[ing] conduct by establishing ‘criteria
of wrongdoing and imposing its principal consequence on those who transgress its standard.’”
Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *17 (quoting The Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36-
37 (1922)). But it is precisely the nonpunitive character of the minimum coverage provision that
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distinguishes it from criminal penalties and other assessments that courts have found not to
qualify as “taxes.” Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778-79 (1994)
(describing distinction between “punitive,” as opposed to “remedial,” assessments); Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38 (recognizing that a “mere penalty” – one that cannot qualify as a tax –
is one that includes “penalizing features”). Application of the penalty does not turn on the
taxpayer’s scienter – a characteristic of a punitive measure, as recognized in The Child Labor
Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36-37. Nor will it result in the assessment of “highly exorbitant”
obligations that might show an intent to “punish rather than to tax.” United States v. Constantine,
296 U.S. 287, 294, 295 (1935). Indeed, the penalty under the minimum coverage provision is
capped at the lower of the cost of qualifying insurance, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1)(B), or 1 percent
(in 2014) of the taxpayer’s household income, § 5000A(c)(2)(B), and may be less than that, see
id.§ 5000A(c)(2)(A), (3). Cf. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950) (“rational
foundation” for tax rate showed it was not a punitive sanction in disguise). Moreover, payment of
the penalty relieves the taxpayer of the obligation to purchase insurance, in contrast with punitive
provisions that require an individual who violates a statute to pay a penalty while still requiring
that they satisfy the underlying obligation. See United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of
Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1996). Thus, the minimum coverage provision cannot be
deemed to fall outside Congress’s taxing power on the ground that it is punitive in nature.
Plaintiffs also reference the regulatory nature of the penalty as if that were decisive proof
that it is not a tax. It is settled, however, that, as long as it is not punitive in character, a tax “does
not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed.”  Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44. “Every tax is in some measure regulatory” in that “it
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interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.” 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). As long as a statute is “productive of some
revenue,” Congress may exercise its taxing powers irrespective of any “collateral inquiry as to
the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax.”  Id. at 514; id. at 512 (rejecting the argument that a
tax on firearms dealers was “not a true tax, but a penalty imposed for the purpose of suppressing
traffic in a certain noxious type of firearms”); see also United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86,
93-94 (1919) (only requirement for an exercise of the taxing power is that there be “some
reasonable relation” to the “raising of revenue”).
Significantly, plaintiffs do not deny that the minimum coverage provision will generate
revenue. Indeed, that fact is not subject to dispute. Under the provision’s plain design, it is
projected that some taxpayers will undoubtedly be required to add the § 5000A penalty to the
amount they owe when paying their annual income taxes, and the amount paid pursuant to §
5000A will commingle with the rest of the amount paid, and together these amounts will
contribute revenue to the public fisc. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the
minimum coverage provision will yield approximately $4 million a year. See CBO Letter to
Speaker Pelosi 2 tbl. 4. Because the revenue-raising requirement is met here, the provision is a
valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power. 
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in defendants’ opening brief, even if this Court denies
defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, defendants are, in the alternative, entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, and summary judgment should therefore be entered in their favor.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2011. Respectfully submitted,
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